William Keitel v. Joseph Mazurkiewicz by unknown
2013 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
8-30-2013 
William Keitel v. Joseph Mazurkiewicz 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2013 
Recommended Citation 
"William Keitel v. Joseph Mazurkiewicz" (2013). 2013 Decisions. 273. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2013/273 
This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2013 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
 
No. 12-4027 
_____________ 
  
WILLIAM A. KEITEL, 
 
                                     Appellant  
 
v. 
  
JOSEPH MAZURKIEWICZ;  
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE STATE OF 
PENNSYLVANIA  
_____________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Western District of Pennsylvania 
(No. 2-11-cv-01209) 
District Judge:  Hon. Nora B. Fischer 
 
Before:  CHAGARES, VANASKIE, and SHWARTZ, Circuit 
Judges. 
 
(Filed: August 30, 2013) 
____________ 
 
OPINION 
____________ 
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Chris R. Eyster, Esq. 
100 Ross Street 
Suite 304 
Pittsburgh, PA 15219-2013 
 Attorney for Appellant 
 
Ronald M. Wabby, Jr., Esq. 
Office of the District Attorney 
401 Allegheny County Courthouse 
Pittsburgh, PA 15219 
 Attorney for Appellees 
CHAGARES, Circuit Judge. 
Appellant William Keitel was convicted in late 1998 
by a jury in the Pennsylvania Court of Common Pleas of first 
degree murder, third degree murder, aggravated assault, and 
five counts of recklessly endangering another person.  
Keitel’s aggregate sentence was life imprisonment plus thirty-
five to seventy years of imprisonment.  Keitel unsuccessfully 
appealed his convictions and sentence.  His efforts to seek 
relief under Pennsylvania’s Post Conviction Relief Act were 
similarly unsuccessful. 
 
 Keitel filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 in the United States District 
Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania in September 
2011.  The District Court denied the petition and Keitel 
timely appealed.  We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
§§ 1291 and 2253. 
 
 The case has been fully briefed by the parties and is 
listed to be heard by the Court on September 26, 2013.  
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However, the parties notified the Court that Keitel died on 
August 11, 2013.  The appellees now contend that Keitel’s 
case is moot and should be dismissed.  In response, Keitel’s 
attorney of record has advised the Court that Keitel’s parents, 
his “next of kin,” desire “to continue the appeal to clear their 
son’s name.” 
 
 Article III of the Constitution limits the federal courts 
to adjudication of actual, ongoing “[c]ases” and 
“[c]ontroversies.”  U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.  The “case-
or-controversy requirement subsists through all stages of 
federal judicial proceedings, trial and appellate.”  Lewis v. 
Cont’l Bank Corp., 494 U.S. 472, 477 (1990).  “Courts 
enforce the case-or-controversy requirement through several 
justiciability doctrines,” which “include standing, ripeness, 
mootness, the political-question doctrine, and the prohibition 
on advisory opinions.”  Toll Bros., Inc. v. Twp. of 
Readington, 555 F.3d 131, 137 (3d Cir. 2009).  As we have 
observed, “[i]f developments occur during the course of 
adjudication that eliminate a plaintiff’s personal stake in the 
outcome of a suit or prevent a court from being able to grant 
the requested relief, the case must be dismissed as moot.”  
Blanciak v. Allegheny Ludlum Corp., 77 F.3d 690, 698-99 
(3d Cir. 1996).  We consider whether Keitel’s death renders 
this appeal moot. 
 
 Section 2254 empowers a federal court to grant a 
petitioner relief from unlawful state custody.  See Preiser v. 
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484 (1973) (noting that “the 
essence of habeas corpus is an attack by a person in custody 
upon the legality of that custody, and that the traditional 
function of the writ is to secure release from illegal 
custody.”); Barry v. Brower, 864 F.2d 294, 296 (3d Cir. 
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1988) (holding that “a district court’s power to grant a writ of 
habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 is limited . . . to 
directing [the petitioner’s] release from custody.”).  Because 
Keitel has died, he is no longer “in custody.”  See 28 U.S.C. § 
2254(a).  Accordingly, we conclude that Keitel’s habeas 
petition has been rendered moot by his death.  We note that 
our decision today is in accord with that of every other Court 
of Appeals to have considered this issue.  See, e.g., Bruno v. 
Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 700 F.3d 445, 445 (11th Cir. 2012) 
(“The death of the habeas petitioner renders a habeas action 
moot.”); Garceau v. Woodford, 399 F.3d 1101, 1101 (9th Cir. 
2005); McMillin v. Bowersox, 102 F.3d 987, 987 (8th Cir. 
1996); McClendon v. Trigg, 79 F.3d 557, 559 (7th Cir. 1996); 
Knapp v. Baker, 509 F.2d 922, 922 (5th Cir. 1975).  See also 
Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 168 n.2 (1986) (“[T]he 
habeas petitioner . . . died prior to the District Court’s 
decision, so his case became moot.”); In re Kravitz, 504 
F.Supp. 43, 49-50 (M.D. Pa. 1980). 
 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will vacate the District 
Court’s order denying the petition and remand this case to the 
District Court with instructions to dismiss the petition as 
moot. 
 
